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Thursday, February 5. 2009Harddisk encryptionComments
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"In many cases the key management is the weak point, not the encryption itself. And key management is hard to get right regardless of where the encryption sits."
Could you make that line bold? Maybe blinking too? I don't think it can be overstressed. :)
Key management sucks, especially in Linux where there's a variety of tools using a variety of keys: SSH, GPG, SSL.
Take for example using any given DVCS:
1. You branch from a remote repository using HTTP+SSL.
2. You make some changes and sign your commits using GPG.
3. You push your changes to a remote server via SSH.
We've just used 2 or 3 different key management systems within one application! (It could be 2 if you're using something like Seahorse in Gnome which manages both SSH & GPG keys.)
Luckily DVCSes are (hopefully) being used by people with enough knowledge to intelligently handle the various encryption technologies. So if they get a warning message about some key, certificate, or hash being incorrect, they know something is amiss.
However, how many keys and key management systems is it really safe to expect non-developers/sysadmins to learn? I don't know, but the current key management tools leave me even taking risky shortcuts like using self-signed SSL certs and weak keyring passphrases. *sigh*
(Tangentially, this sounds promising: http://michael.susens-schurter.com/blog/2008/10/20/fedoras-crypto-consolidation/ --Sorry for linking to my own blog.)
I think you've missed the number one reason many people don't trust drives to do hardware encryption. Given that you can't look at the implementation, how do you know it doesn't do key escrow?
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